

Farewell Nation-State & Welcome World Society?

/ The Nation-State in the Systems-Theoretical Approach /

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Introduction

At the beginning of the third millennium social scientific disciplines have to broaden their view on a new global social, political, economic and cultural frame of reference. The enhancement of a perspective on the world horizon calls for scientists to exceed familiar boundaries. The variety of border-crossing undertakings in social sciences include conceptualizations of world society and the changing role of the nation-state.

The cognitive interest of the paper is a dissociation of nation-state-related social models and a broadening of the view on world society. Within the conceptual framework of world society, social structures, processes, fields and interdependencies are recognizable which are de facto decoupled from a nation-state system. The term *world society* is used – despite its complexity – as a central concept of the paper's subject definition. At this point it is important to note that the term *society* – as a central concept in sociology – as well as the variations of the term content ranging from *International Society* (see Bull/Watson 1984; Buzan 2004) to *Transnational Society* (see Burton 1972; Kaiser 1969), *Global Society* (see Albrow 1996; Crossley/Lees/Servos 2004) up to the term *World Society* (see for the different schools of thought on the term Wittmann 2011) itself – in terms of their definitions, glossary of terms and uses of the terms – are clearly distinct from conceptualizations of world society.

The overarching goal of the paper is to understand *world society and its nexus to the nation-state* as a context, as an object and also as a challenge to social sciences. Here the focus is directed to the question on the role of the nation-state in a specific discourse on world society. For a substantial part of the article, the *systems-theoretical conceptualization of world society and its nexus to the nation-state* is demonstrated. The following part begins with an illustration of the terms of the nation-state and world society, then the systems-theoretical conceptualization of world society is demonstrated, and thirdly an outlook of this conceptualization of world society is presented.

1. The Terms Nation-State and World Society

At the beginning it is insightful to take a look at the definition of *state* and *nation*.¹ The first term, *state*, may be defined as follows paraphrasing the classic Georg Jellinek according to Claus Offe (2007: 518):

“From the outside, a state is the combination of a state authority, a state territory (with fixed and externally recognized borders) and a state folk (as the totality of members of a ‘political community’)”.²

Furthermore, the prior establishment of a claim to power, which refers to the whole of the inhabitants of a territory is viewed as central to ensure that states are legal or democratic welfare states (see Offe 2007: 527). The second concept, that of the *nation*, is defined in such a way:

“The nation is an order of magnitude of political community, which is between that of the ‘tribe’ and that of the ‘imperium’ (‘Empire’) and other variants of multi-national political communities which also includes e.g. the European Union. Nation and state are notably not always congruent. So we know the case that several nations live together in one state (...). The reverse case, that a nation includes several states, is also conceivable (...)” (Offe 2007: 527).³

Claus Offe cites Belgium, Spain and the UK as examples of the case that several nations live together in one state. As examples of nations that have several states, the no longer existent state of the German Democratic Republic, and Austria, are given (see Offe 2007: 527).⁴

The third term, *world society*, is a concept that allows a variety of social-theoretical assumptions and therefore defies a simple definition. In social science discourses dealing analytically or normatively with world society, the term is controversially discussed (see Wittmann 2014: 113ff.). The discourses range from rejecting the term (e.g. Tudyka 1989) to labelling world society as an emerging world society (e.g. Münch 1998; Bornschier 2002; Habermas 1998) up to describing world society as already existing (e.g. Luhmann 1997; Stichweh 2000; Tyrell 2005). As a basic understanding, the term *world society* is used here as described below: As a key challenge in dealing with world society the immense

¹ In this paper the terms *nation* and *state* are not used in the following notation: *nationstate*. This term is based on the unity of state and nation. Such a condition has grown obsolete. On account of this, the term here is hyphenated; that is, cited as *nation-state*. With this notation, the *separation of the concepts of nation and state* is taken into account.

² The quotation was translated literally from German to English by the author.

³ The quotation was translated literally from German to English by the author.

⁴ Offe’s examples are limited to Europe. At this point, however, it may be constructive to extend the scope to other world areas. On the African continent countless examples are to be found where the concept of a nation very often refers directly to several states. The *Khoi-Khoi* and *San* people in South Africa, Botswana and Namibia as well as the *Masai* People in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania are just two examples among countless.

complexity of the concept should be taken into account, as Peter Heintz (1980: 97) noted decades ago: “If I study world society I am studying a very particular type of society, the knowledge of which promises to be fruitful for theory construction. This society has no identity, and it is not perceived by most of its members. In other words, I am studying a stateless society of immense complexity”.

World society for Peter Heintz therefore presented a particular type of society which differs from those hitherto known; as this social structure is both extremely complex, there is neither a common state nor is it held together by a common culture, and also the members of world society so far not do not perceive this type of society.

Besides its complexity, world society is also an *interdisciplinarily used term*. Furthermore there are also different approaches in social sciences that work with the term. As much as there are conceptualizations of world society that have arisen in sociology, there are numerous approaches based on the wide range of world society research from disciplines like political science and international relations.

2. The Nation-State in the Systems-Theoretical Approach

2.a. Nation and World Society

Nation is an 18th century term which presented a claim to a new form of statehood. It can be seen as a voluntarist conception which unified both the duties of action and the rights of participation in historically different contexts. The process of including everyone in the political system – with an oscillating between-rights-and-duties importance spectrum of ‘inclusion’ – is probably the real key for the emergence of modern nations (see Stichweh 2000: 48f.).

There are two historically identifiable action movements in relation to the state of the nation. On the one hand, the existence of a nation adopted an argument which served to justify the claim to statehood⁵, and on the other hand, there was in many cases the undertaking that a pre-existing state had tried to shape its citizens into the unity of a nation.⁶ One terminology in which this is expressed is the distinction between *political nations* versus *ethnic nations*. In both cases, the direction of action by the

⁵ The Kurdish region, Palestine or the Basque region are examples of this.

⁶ Examples would be France or Spain. In this context, the expression of the *rainbow nation* by the post-apartheid state South Africa is interesting. This term was created so that all South Africans could identify themselves beyond traditional splits with the newborn democratic state being established in 1994. Here an existent, democratic state attempted to shape its citizens to the unit of a nation.

state or to the state is without contradiction. In whatever manner the merger of state and nation, it is basically the premise that the participation of citizens and their number assumed an importance for the entire spectrum of the political community that had never been seen in older law forms to the same extent. The state is now based on a unification of its citizens, which takes the form of a nation. The concept of a nation thus combines the participation of each person as a member of the nation, with the expectation that it can be merged into a single unit addressed to this multiplicity of members (see Stichweh 2000: 49f.).

In modern political systems, the term of unity occurs in two respects: in the nation as a unit of all citizens, which are also the fundamental and legally founded parts of the state, and second, under the heading of sovereignty, which refers all decision-making powers to the head of state.

Such a concept of nation is referred to as a *paradoxical entity* by Rudolf Stichweh (see 2000: 50), because either one analyses the nation as a society that is a community, or alternatively, one says the nation is the society of the state. In both the above-mentioned cases, the nation attests at the same time to *two mutually exclusive attributes – community/society; society/state*.

Since the beginning of the 19th century has been in the definitions of the term of the nation the component of the *community* predominant. It is only the fact of the communicative dimension, together with the numerical size of the community, which allows the interpretation that it can be referred to as a society. This leads to a definition of the nation as a society which doubles as a community. Nation and nation-state are between their integration into traditional local contexts and the complexity of world society as that emergent social system which brings together all conceivable communication to the unity of one – and only one – system worldwide. Only world society is – in the precise sense of this term – a society, and it includes within it as world society all the other inequalities that have been brought about by socio-cultural evolution and the operation of functional systems (see Stichweh 2000: 51f.).

In the present, the concept of a nation no longer refers to the origin of people, but merely to a merger that has yet to be established, organized and maintained (see Luhmann 1998: 364f.). Likewise, national identity is not given, but it must be determined, deserved and protected. As the nation may merely be an “*imagined community*” (see Anderson 2006), it needs a state to concretize it. Both are looking at the same time to find a *territorial identity*.

The idea of a nation so far remains just an idea, if the building of a state is not the result (see Luhmann 1998: 364ff.). In sociological systems theory, three functions of the nation-state in world society can be identified (see Stichweh 2000: 52f.):

First function: In its perspective, the achievements of the nation are considerable in view of the expectation of uncertainty that the nation *excludes inequality (because it externalizes them into the world society)* and at the same time includes an *apparent equality (all members of the nation)*.

Second function: In addition to ensuring the equality-/inequality-relations in the world social system, another relevant function of the nation-state in the world society is that of the *fixing of state boundaries*. As they represent national borders, they have an inherent plausibility. So, it can be assumed that with the establishment of the nation-state constitutive of the unity of the state, for example, it may be questionable whether a state should incorporate an ethnic group or another area.

Third function: Another important function of the nation-state in world society is to *guarantee a relative cultural homogeneity inside* and also as a mutually supportive way of maintaining or possibly even increasing cultural difference between the different nation-states: A nation is always considered pronounced a cultural entity (see Stichweh 2000: 53).

In this way nation approaches that place that was interpreted in the past as feudal order or tradition. This corresponds to the idea that at the level of world society culture can only have a comparatively low degree of articulation or elaboration. The abstract repertoire of possibilities is rather in world society, especially for the inclusive attenuation or reinterpretation of national cultural identities, insofar as these are incompatible with other cultures in world society. The last point – the pressure on the inclusive reduction of cultural sensitivity – especially applies to those nation-states which adopt the playing of a politically significant role in the global social system. This is not seen as a cultural management function. Those states which tread pass such a cultural path are therefore disadvantaged in the world social system. In addition to the immense economic *equality-/inequality-threshold*, which is a demarcation line of the level of the nation-states from the level of world society, another one is added, a similar *cultural homogeneity-/inhomogeneity-threshold* (see Stichweh 2000: 53f.).

This view raises two issues; first that world society may still be a system, and secondly how it as a social system takes into account the reality and the functions of the nation-state. The first question, how world society may still be a system, is answered by Rudolf Stichweh as follows:

World society is a system as a global connectivity of communications – and even if this connection, as ‘creative understanding’, which is not to be distinguished from misunderstanding strictly and certainly not normatively, takes place while ignoring the cultural context.

In this way arise, *inter alia*, world art and world literature as expectation formations, which owe their past history its own weight quickly. The second question, the mode in which world society as a social system takes into account the reality and the functions of the nation-state is answered as follows: Law as national sovereignty is obvious for world society; not only a structural fact of an underlying system level, on the level of the world society rather an expectation structure crystallizes, which normatizes certain components of national statehood and addresses them to individual states as normative expectations. At the same time, states are stabilized in their existence due to these world social structures of expectations and associated institutions (international organizations, etc.). It is not via the subject of international relations, nor one of a network – for example multilateral contacts – by which nation-states weave the world social system. It is the normative expectation structure, which is the basis of the option of international relations and the establishment of national law in each singular case, which is of primary interest for sociological systems theory. In this sense, the rule is for the form of national sovereignty to be understood as an institutionalized world on a social level guiding principle. This central idea is formed then as an institutionalized idea dynamic of further state-building in world society (see Stichweh 2000: 54f.).

The historical conditions of the emergence of this global structure of expectation go back to the universalism of the European Middle Ages, as well as to the acquisition of Roman law in many different areas of the world. Again, this is to be understood as a *universalist moment*. Furthermore, the European states system formed in the early modern period combines with the imagination to suggest that a political macro order exists, which has a republican form and is located above the level of states (see Stichweh 2000: 55f.).

Key elements of world society expectancy structure, that have the nation-state as the theme of expectation formation, can for example be seen in the following structurally relevant point: that the nation-state results from a decomposition of world society, and that it allowed this to be fully performed as a decomposition into territorially clearly limited states. At this point the *moment of the national* means in the long term a *stabilization of territorial boundaries*.

The latter have two other characteristics. Firstly, the spatial distance between two countries is very low and secondly the differentiation of national cultures allows that with this very small spatial distance a (cultural) interrupt occurs. For this reason, states on the basis of nationality are regarded as *closed systems against each other*, where the imputations are absolute to a closed system of the nation-state. These absolute allocations allow the stabilization of nation-states as relatively closed systems (see Stichweh 2000: 57).

Nation-states are, in the world social system, isomorphic in shape. This means they have a territorial limit as well as a name, and are individualized on the foundation of a culture. On this basis, they are exhibited without distinctions classifiable in world society. In addition to these similarities in shape, similarities are also evident on the level of structure-forming expectations of legitimate statehood. Regarding the structure a commitment to modernity and welfare is recognizable. The state pulls itself under the premises of the nation-state as an instrument which is used to optimize the realization of the interests of the nation – and it is this self-concept that lies in the system of world society in the form of a normative expectation of law. It can also be assumed that modern institutions – such as universities – are indispensable for any legitimate and modern state itself a part of the culture of the nation-state present in world society. The principle of inclusion, which has led to the political order of the nation-state, has established itself at the level of the political system of world society. The political system of the world can no longer be understood in terms of major powers (see Stichweh 2000: 57f.).

Inclusion in the political system of the world order takes the form in which an egalitarian basis structure of national sovereignty arises, which in principle equates all states to each other. This structure has an open-ended function. While the function of the nation-state is also essential in the long run for submitting equality/inequality-differences into the system of world society, the effect of egalitarian base structure of national sovereignty is the fact that it counteracts this institutionalized preservation of inequality with at least a formally balancing principle.

States formally have the same dignity, regardless of their level of economic development as states in world society. Due to the leveling of national sovereignty, a reversible trend in world politics also becomes evident. Although a process of territorial centralization of states took place during the 19th century, a contrary process has been is to be determined since Second World War (see Stichweh 2000: 59f.).

2. b. *The State of the Political System in the World*

As an introduction, a disambiguation of what is precisely meant by the term state takes place. A large number of ethno-historical and cultural-historical writings summarize the concept of the state as a universal category, which always comes to be used at the moment when asymmetrical structures of domination are developing in a society. The forms of domination which arise in the course of a long history, however, tend to be so different that a conceptual summary promises little knowledge. Even if the study search is narrowed to European history, this does not produce a clear concept of the state (see Luhmann 1998: 345).

In sociological systems theory, therefore, the social *function of policy of (collectively binding) decision-making* is assumed and the state is only present when this term is *de facto* necessary for the *self-designation of a political order*. Such a need has, however, only existed since the early modern period. But this view does not *ad hoc* lead to a clarification of the term. In most cases when we speak of a state, the context of which state one is mentioning, and whether it comes to a matter of internal or foreign policy, is already made clear. Significantly less clear is *what is meant when state* is mentioned. States have a name; that is, in communication one can make a reference to states with this name without addressing clearly what is described by the name. There are no states without a name; and if a new state is formed (by the division of an old state or by mergers), the naming is the first necessary communicative act of existence (see Luhmann 1998: 345f.).

Furthermore, a territorial reference is absolutely necessary. Due to the fact that there are multiple states, territorial borders are indispensable. A state must be found on a map as well as in the real world. But what exactly is referred to when states are named by their names and they can be found on a map or in reality? Political theory answers this question by stating so that it becomes a state if there are people, a government authority as well as a territory. All three elements have to be present to speak of a state. The state population stands here for the restlessness, whereas the state power represents the order by means of violence withdrawn from the people. Nevertheless, here it is not clear what is to be described with the summary of the elements and with the unity of the term (see Luhmann 1998: 346f.).

Based on the traditional theory of the state, the starting point for an understanding of the concept of the state in terms of state power is seen in sociological systems theory, formulated in a general *theory of violence*. The two characteristics of state territory and people can be empirically determined even under quantitative circumstances, whereas the term *state power* has remained imprecise and nebulous.

As the term *violence* has not been clarified yet, a more abstract concept formation is possible: The power of the state is used to prevent violence from other sources – with a greater or lesser degree of success, as we know, but as a support for expectations. With the concept of violence, a negative self-reference (and consequently: a paradox) is thus connected. Violence serves the expulsion of violence. This means that the exclusion of violence is already included in the term of violence. The term itself, therefore, also defines exclusionary violence as well as excluded violence. It describes a case of *entrapment of exclusion* and is, therefore, a paradoxical term. The solution to this paradox is found in the term *state power*. This means the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence and has as a postulate for the state power the legitimacy. In this way legitimacy is a conceptual feature of state power. This comes about not due to the validity of the normative justification of its legitimacy, but is crucial to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate violence: Although the legitimacy of state power will revert automatically (as part of its terms their term), it is still the subject of an ongoing effort. The legitimacy of state power must be alleged in the distinction legitimate/illegitimate.

At the operational level, this means that state power cannot indifferently let violations of their rules happen, but must set an example and react. On the semantic level, this means that justifiable reasons (semantics, ideologies) must be developed that explain what legitimate violence advocates.

So legitimizing violence becomes a permanent business of politics that can, however, rely in all material respects on self-evident truths (values) (see Luhmann 1998: 347ff.).

The separation of politics and religion has been included in the obvious structures of society since the Middle Ages. The political system has to some extent borne responsibility since then for its legitimacy, and this has only been possible with the help of the value of decisions. Referring to the locus of the problem of including the exclusion of violence is in sociological system theory as a locus not a presupposing political system assumed, but the system of society. Only with the consolidation of the territorial state itself was the right to wage legal wars limited to states and as a result of this it can be clearly differentiated between war and peace. Based on these assumptions, the theory of the state refers with the term of violence to the system of society (see Luhmann 1998: 349f.).

If the function and relevance of states are being discussed at the beginning of the third millennium, it is recommended according to this approach to assume the concept of world society. Surely a global communication system is at our disposal. From a political perspective, it is especially the new communication technologies and television that show an effect.

The *locus* at which a person is located is no longer important for the option of seeing and hearing, the place is in this way information-technologically trivialized.

There will be a transcendence of all space-related centralisms. One can in principle – and every day – also see what happens elsewhere, and indeed almost instantaneously, in any case, regardless of the time it would take to travel to the scene. In this sense it does not matter at which place there is a staging of reports; *it is a world-public space*. Even in world politics, initiated interventions in local events achieve new ways of intelligibility.

If in this global communication system even the title of 'society' is sometimes denied (but it is called 'global system'), this may be due to tradition-based term targets, which merge the concept of society with the nation-state, but are no longer covered by any serious theory (see Luhmann 1998: 373f.).

So it is with similarities to living conditions or similarities of culture; these are also not to be found in urban centres and megacities. Likewise, the traditional notion of a *societas civilis*, a political society, can serve states as political systems and therefore must be construed as societies. All of these resistors require little persuasion for their characterization, since one must increasingly include *typical features of modernity in the term 'globalizing tendencies'*.

The concrete dependence of individual states on other states is reduced, and at the same time their dependence on the political system of world society increases. Thus the term of sovereignty loses its protective function against superiority. Neither in the form of 'rule' nor in the form of 'culture' or 'values' does the concept of world-society presuppose centralization. Typical is rather a heterarchical, connectionist, network-like linking of communications at the level of organizations and professions (see Luhmann 1998: 374f.).

The talk of an international system becomes redundant the moment in which there is a separation from the regional reference of the term of society. This detachment leads to the option of a double differentiation: The world political system is differentiated as a subsystem of world society on the basis of a functional differentiation of the social system and differs from world economy, world science, world law et cetera. And it is internally differentiated in that which we call territorial states. This is a general system-theoretical theorem, which asserts that *differentiation is caused by internal differentiation*.

Since internal differentiation does not find exact environmental correlatives, this is merely accomplished by the *internal reproductive system limits*. Due to this theorem, the relevance of the formation of states to the political system of world society can be shown (see see Luhmann 1998: 375f.).

There are many counter-arguments here which are similar to those that are articulated against a conceivable world state: thus, for example, the diversity of regional conditions in terms of culture and population or economic options, which cannot be managed from a central location.

It is the structure of the world political system in states which reduces the likelihood that the remaining functional systems are politicized. That is, the structure of the world-political system in states preserves the dynamics of other functional systems, but without excluding regional effects of different political support or blocking. Thus, local gravitational points can be located in the individual functional systems without the policy taking a decisive influence on it (see Luhmann 1998: 376f.).

It turns out that the efforts of nation-states to support the interests of their inhabitants benefit and consolidate these trends of globalization of the respective functional systems. So, one result of (national) government policy is the *high degree of organizational and curricular uniformity*. Therefore, the nation-state is not only embedded in the political system of world society, but it is also an important driving force towards the globalization of many other functional systems. This ultimately leads to the question of whether the system-compatible form of segmental internal differentiation of the world system policy is bound to the form of the state (see Luhmann 1998: 377f.).

In the 19th century, the *de facto* enforcement of state power was identified in a specific territory as a central premise of all legitimacy. If considering what everything is constituted as a state, numerous areas are describable that are extremely artificial, and have no real institutionalized structure, due to that fact that under the usual state formula very different things can be found. Nonetheless, the segmented differentiation of the world-political system forces all territories to do so. So there are no areas that participate in policy without at the same time taking the form of '*sovereign*' states. A state must, however, at the same time be more than just an address in international communication, so political efficacy as well as inwardly directed assertiveness are necessary conditions (see Luhmann 1998: 378f.).

In systems-theoretical terms, the collective communication ability of states is indispensable for world politics. This can be ensured only by organizations and does not arise *per se* from the assertiveness of power. Under world social conditions, therefore, the organized capacity to represent a segment of the world political system internally and to deputize it in a communicative manner against other segments will have to be held to be decisive.

Weaknesses of internal assertiveness can be tolerated. Only civil war-like situations make moderately successful counter-governments, so doubts about the appropriate form of address are a problem for the world's political system. This is because world society and its political system are based on operational communication and it therefore cannot afford to dismiss all territories of their the communicative competence. These assumptions have profound consequences compared to a traditional concept of the state.

In particular, the imaginations of sovereign states conceal more than they reveal. In this approach, policy is construed in the current world political system as a *world-socially necessary function collectively binding decision-making*, where the segmental differentiation of the world political system in territorial states makes them capable of zooming this function forward to immensely differing regional conditions: in particular, differentiations which have world-economic, cultural or environmental causes and are as such produced by world society itself. However, a minimum level of '*similarity*' of the segments is a prerequisite for segmentary differentiation. Here the problem is one of ensuring both equality and diversity at the same time. In sociological system theory this happens by the decrease of equality to statehood and through the reduction of statehood to organized communication competence (see Luhmann 1998: 379f.).

After the reconstruction of this approach towards world society in which, its key concepts and central characteristics on the role of the nation-state were worked out *inter alia*, a brief analysis now is given in a further step. Nation-state boundaries are not considered to be insignificant in the conceptualization of sociological systems theory.

Policy is resisted as a subsystem of the social system of society. Questions about the existence of a *world state* for the constitution of world society do not matter. The political system of world society is divided into nation-states, therefore this fact theory-immanent represents no problem for sociological system theory and its conceptualization of world society.

After the elaboration of the system-theoretical access to the role of the nation-state in world society, an outlook on this access to the subject of world society is dealt with below.

3. Résumé

The systems-theoretical conceptualization of world society refers to a global reference frame of society. The approach of sociological systems theory rejects the existence of regional or nation-state societies for theory-based reasons. Here only world society exists. *At this point the world is taken as a reference framework of society and that social science studies of the present also do not get along without this global level.*

This conceptualizations of world society does not presuppose the *existence of a world state*. In sociological systems theory, focuses on questions about the necessity of a world state for the constitution of world society do not matter. Likewise, nation-state boundaries are in this conceptualization of world society to be not considered negligible. *The existence of a world state is not assumed for the constitution of world society in the systems-theoretical conceptualization of world society.*

In sociological systems theory, policy is viewed as a subsystem of the social system of society. The world political system is divided into nation-states; this fact is not a theory-immanent problem for this theory and its conceptualization of world society. Nation-state boundaries are to be not considered negligible in this world society approach. In systems theory the nation-state serves mainly as an addressee for global political communication. It is interesting to note that sociological systems theory thematises the point of the role of the nation-state in contributing to the spread of *isomorphic patterns worldwide*.

Given this world society research, social sciences are confronted with an often unthinkingly applied nation-state paradigm and a state-centred vocabulary, which opposes the perception of the global as a perspective and places sociological knowledge about transnational social spaces or postterritorial *Vergemeinschaftungen* to the perception of the *social world as a totality* in normative respects, often still in a speculative corner.

The topic of world society, with respect to many socio-scientific topics such as class and social structure analyses of poverty and inequality research as well as research fields of cultural or political

issues, requires the stepping out from the analysis unit, often assumed to be self-evident, of a "nationally organized society". Classic questions of social sciences for social change, inequality, culture, power and dominion, and last but not least, the terminology of society have not themselves become obsolete because of this world society approach, but they are moved into a different perspective. In particular, their size ratio varies in the moment in which these questions are related to the global reference level.

The systems-theoretical world society approach was preparing the way that social sciences can enter the contemporary stage of a *social world as a unit* decades before globalization discourses. It has set trendsetting signposts for academics in the direction of building a "global house of social sciences" with its conception of a theory which has the world as a frame of reference. On that account it is expected to be openly and constructively facing the social, political and economic challenges of the 21st century.

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